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A

I. INTRODUCTION

NY SERIOUS EXPLORATION of unity and fragmentation in
public international law must consider the normative basis of
one of the fundamental tools of state action on the international
plane: jurisdiction. And no better illustration of the fluctuating application of jurisdiction may be had than to take a national sample – such as
Canada – of domestic courts’ struggles to establish accountability for
human rights conduct and abuses abroad. The paradigms of the law of
jurisdiction, as with the vast corpus of international law, originally
responded to the needs of the traditional verities of a legal system based
around the state – states as sovereign, unitary entities, in relationships of
mutual respect for their equality, independence and co-existence. The
associated principle, recognised by the Permanent Court of International
Justice in the Steamship Lotus case,1 that a state was free to exert jurisdiction in the absence of a prohibitive rule, was sufficient in times when
national legal systems concerned themselves nearly exclusively with individuals within their territorial or national control. Even as international
human rights law flourished in the latter half of the twentieth century, the
* Schulich School of Law, Dalhousie University, Halifax NS Canada.
1
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central idea was that states owed each other obligations to guarantee
rights to their own citizens and residents, and so breaches were to be handled internally. The law was premised on police enforcing a state’s law
within its borders, and residents being able to seek redress before local
courts.
This traditional approach is increasingly giving way, as a result of rapid
globalisation, to a system of mutual interdependence of states. Sovereignty,
it is said, is not as robust as it once was, and accordingly the simple
principles of jurisdiction are no longer adequate. States now engage in
criminal investigations (enforcement jurisdiction) on a multi-territorial
basis, where sovereign exclusivity is a barrier rather than a boon in the
fight against transnational crime. And as state activities exceed borders,
so too individuals who suffer at the hands of state agents now seek human
rights-based remedies in a number of jurisdictions. Driven by these
changes, the principles of jurisdiction, like those of sovereignty, are
becoming modulated by both state practice and by treaty. In particular,
transnational assertions of state jurisdiction and of human rights protections have aroused a contest within international law, in which states
struggle to ascertain the scope and limits of their ability to take both public and private law jurisdiction over human rights violations.
As these changes occur, there is an inevitable loss of unity in the traditional principles of state jurisdiction. Fragmentation of the law occurs as
state practice shifts, putting customary international law in flux. More
certainty is offered by jurisdictional requirements in treaty regimes but
these are at best piecemeal because they have only partial membership
and deal only with sectoral issues. Indeed, partial treaty regimes tend to
concretise the fragmentation of jurisdictional rules. In turn, domestic
courts, which must discover the applicable international law on jurisdiction and observe it in disputes before them, encounter a distended body
of norms that presents a tension between the traditional rules and the new
practices. Court decisions reflect the ongoing fragmentation in the law
and, in turn, contribute to the diverse state practice that underlies the
splintering of norms and needs.
This chapter will illustrate the flux and fragmentation in the principles
of state jurisdiction by examining Canada’s treatment of the prevention,
punishment and reparation of international human rights law violations.
Canadian courts have recently issued a number of decisions that reflect
the struggle over jurisdictional issues. In the public law case of R v Hape,2
and subsequent decisions, the Supreme Court of Canada refused to apply
Canada’s international human rights obligations extraterritorially, argu2
[2007] 2 SCR 292, ILDC 758 (CA 2007). Available at www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc/
doc/2007/2007scc26/2007scc26.html (last visited 1 June 2011) All Canadian judgments
referred to herein can be found online at the website of the Canadian Legal Institute (www.
canlii.org).
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ing that to do so would violate the principle of foreign state sovereignty.
In Bouzari v Iran,3 a leading appellate court declined jurisdiction in a
private law suit involving serious human rights violations that took place
abroad, based on traditional readings of the limitations of territorial
jurisdiction and the privileges of state sovereignty. In each case, there are
international law precedents or instruments that suggest a contrary result,
but it cannot be said that there is a solid principle demanding it.
The arguments and reasoning expressed by the Canadian courts in
reaching their decisions, in both the public (criminal) and private (civil)
law cases, mirror the tensions between unity and fragmentation in the
international law of state jurisdiction. For the purpose of this chapter, it is
not as important what the courts ultimately decided as their engagement
with the conflicting international legal concepts and sources, and the way
they wrestled with those materials in their judgments. The leading
Canadian cases in both public and private law areas eventually reached
decisions in line with principles of sovereignty and thus they support traditional concepts of jurisdiction and the unity of those principles. That
those cases may have been wrongly decided in light of other expansive
Canadian national jurisprudence in the human rights field is beside the
point of the present discussion about the international law of jurisdiction.
The significance of the cases for present purposes is that the courts were
alert to, and took very seriously, the arguments founded in international
human rights law, which would have led them to reach decisions that
would tend to fragment the traditional principles of jurisdiction. In this
sense, Canadian experience is a synecdoche: the part that illustrates the
whole, the specific that elucidates the general. Canadian judicial uncertainty nationally epitomises the growing legal disorder internationally.
In explanation of these assertions, this chapter will review the principles of state jurisdiction as a precursor to exploring first the public law
contest and then the private law stand-off in the Canadian courts around
the extension of jurisdiction to protect human rights abroad. It will conclude with reflections on the fragmentation of the international law of
jurisdiction that this Canadian synecdoche reveals.
II. THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF JURISDICTION

It is important to ground the discussion of Canadian court practices that
follows in the international law of jurisdiction – the latter term understood
simply to mean the state’s ability to exert power over persons, places, subject matter and things. The discussion taking place here engages all three of
3
(2004), 243 DLR (4th) 406, 71 OR (3d) 675 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal to SCC refused, 25
January 2005, ILDC 175 (CA 2004). Available at www.canlii.org/en/on/onca/doc/2004/200
4canlii871/2004canlii871.html (last visited 1 June 2011).
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the ‘categories’ of international law jurisdiction set out in Akehurst’s classic
article:4 ‘prescriptive’ jurisdiction to legislate; ‘enforcement’ jurisdiction to
apply executive authority, for example, investigation or arrest; and ‘judicial’
jurisdiction to adjudicate matters. Judicial jurisdiction has a central position
in this discussion as domestic courts are empowered and required to answer
fundamental international law questions regarding the very ability of the
state to act on the international plane. This applies in both the civil/private
and criminal/public law contexts that are surveyed in this chapter. As well,
these decisions on jurisdiction themselves make up part of the state practice
upon which putative customary international law norms are assessed.
While the starting point of jurisdiction is the plenary, sovereign authority which states have over their own territories, states have always had
extraterritorial interests and recent globalisation has compounded the
problems that arise. Any exertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction by a state
threatens to collide with the interests of other states, territorial or otherwise; obviously, concurrent jurisdictional claims can and do arise. The
starting point is the Lotus case5 which accepted that asserting extraterritorial jurisdiction is not unlawful conduct on the part of states, even in a
system based on territorial sovereignty. Rather, extending extraterritorial
jurisdiction is not illegal per se, but only where it interferes unduly with
the sovereign interests of another state.
In addition to the Lotus case decided in 1927, the Harvard Research
Project, published in 1935, made an important survey of the various ways
by which states asserted their interests and entitlement to extend their
jurisdiction extraterritorially. The exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction
extraterritorially takes the form of the familiar principles of nationality,
passive personality, and protective and universal authority.6 These principles arise most frequently from the criminal and regulatory law and practice of states, and are products of customary international law. They are
sometimes employed in treaties, typically those treaties often referred to
as the ‘suppression conventions’7 that represent efforts by states to criminalise certain conduct under the laws of a large number of national jurisdictions and to coordinate the exercise of jurisdiction over offenders by
prosecuting states.8
M Akehurst, ‘Jurisdiction in International Law’ (1972–73) 46 BYIL 145.
See: n 1.
6
See generally: Harvard Research, ‘Draft Convention on Jurisdiction With Respect to
Crime’ (1935) 29 (Supp) Am J Int’l L 480; Council of Europe, Extraterritorial Criminal
Jurisdiction (Strasbourg, European Committee on Crime Problems, 1990); H Kindred and
P Saunders (eds), International Law: Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied in Canada, 7th edn
(Toronto, Emond Montgomery, 2006) ch 9.
7
N Boister, ‘“Transnational Criminal Law”?’ (2003) 14 Eur J Int’l L 953.
8
eg: International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (1998) 37 ILM
249; the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Financing (2002) Can TS
No 9; and United Nations Convention on Transnational Organized Crime, reprinted (2001)
40 ILM 335.
4
5
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The latter usage reflects the true nature of the principles of jurisdiction:
they are simply tools by which states manage jurisdictional conflicts
between them, whether potential or actualised. Specifically, their function
is bifurcated: on the one hand, they serve normative purposes by providing rules for courts (both domestic and international) to use in rendering
decisions about the legality of actions under international law, as well as a
means for executive decision-makers to gauge the legality of extraterritorial actions; but on the other hand their purpose is to provide a functional
means by which states can communicate their links to and interests in a
particular matter. They help to establish which states have what kinds of
connections to a particular matter, in situations of concurrent jurisdiction.9
While the principles of prescriptive jurisdiction are relatively expansive, the international law regime regarding extraterritorial enforcement
jurisdiction is much more restraining. The cardinal rule is that states are
not permitted to undertake any enforcement activities within the ter
ritories of other states absent the permission of the territorial state.10 This
limitation is, of course, a function of Westphalian sovereignty.
The gap between these two jurisdictional paradigms is well-understood
by international lawyers and easily applied on the purely inter-state level.
However, it is in the exercise of judicial jurisdiction by domestic courts, as
they are called upon to answer questions of international law jurisdiction,
that problems rush in to fill the gap. In particular, as state agents have
begun to act more regularly outside the states’ borders, the courts are confronted with having to determine whether the state’s law (particularly
constitutional law) may be extended to their activities, and what impact
this can and should have on domestic proceedings that relate to those
activities. Conversely, as more refugees from the persecution of their
home states seek to litigate their injuries in their host states, the latter’s
courts are faced with deciding whether they may hear suits about events
that occurred outside their territory and/or at the instigation of foreign
authorities.

9
As Vaughan Lowe has pointed out, while jurisdictional questions often lack ‘clear theoretical answers’, they get answered in a practical sense because states protest excessive
claims of jurisdiction, and conflict is resolved – typically by negotiation; see: V Lowe,
‘Jurisdiction’ in MD Evans (ed), International Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003)
329 ff.
10
Lotus (n 1) paras 18–19. As the Supreme Court of Canada has written, ‘The general rule
that a state’s criminal law applies only within its territory is particularly true of the legal
procedures enacted to enforce it; the exercise of an enforcement jurisdiction is “inherently
territorial”’ (R v Terry [1996] 2 SCR 207, para 17).
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III. PUBLIC LAW PROTECTION OF INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS IN CANADA

Canada is a common law jurisdiction and requires legislation to implement treaties that it has signed. It is a signatory to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and in terms of implementation
the major provisions of the treaty are given domestic effect by the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,11 a constitutional bill of rights
which mostly came into effect in 1982.12 The Charter does not expressly
implement the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, but
its provisions clearly draw upon the treaty and it is treated by the government and the courts as the principal means by which Canada’s inter
national human rights obligations are given effect.13 Section 32 of the
Charter provides that it applies to all Canadian government entities and
their agents, but is silent as to whether it has extraterritorial reach.
The international human rights regimes are also silent about their extraterritorial reach. The relevant provisions14 describe the Member States’
obligations in terms of a state’s ‘jurisdiction’, as in Article 2 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which provides for
applicability to persons ‘within [the state’s] territory and subject to its
jurisdiction’. This kind of prescription has spawned various exercises in
treaty interpretation15 from which may be discerned a clear trend towards
extraterritoriality being permissible and even obligatory among states
which have entered into treaty-based human rights obligations. Under
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, for example, the
United Nations (UN) Human Rights Committee decided in two 1981
complaints against Uruguay16 that a state party could be held ‘accountable for violations of rights under the Covenant which its agents commit
upon the territory of another state, whether with the acquiescence of the
Government of that State or in opposition to it’,17 and that ‘it would be
unconscionable to so interpret the responsibility under Article 2 of the
11
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Charter), Part I of the Constitution Act,
1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK) 1982, c 11.
12
The equality rights provision (s 15) came into effect in 1985.
13
M Freeman and G van Ert, International Human Rights Law (Toronto, Irwin Law, 2004)
188.
14
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
(1950) 213 UNTS 221, art 1; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) 999
UNTS 171, art 2; American Convention on Human Rights (1969) 1144 UNTS 123, art 1.
15
See generally: Coomans and Kamminga (eds), Extraterritorial Application of Human
Rights Treaties (Antwerp, Intersentia, 2004). A sizeable literature also exists; a good sampling
can be found in R Wilde, ‘Triggering State Obligations Extraterritorially: The Spatial Test in
Certain Human Rights Treaties’ (2007) 40 Is L Rev 503, 506 (fn 7).
16
Lopez Burgos v Uruguay, Comm No R/12/52, UN Doc Supp No 40 (A/36/40), 176; and
Celiberti de Casariego v Uruguay, Comm No R/13/56, UN Doc Supp No 40 (A/36/40), 185.
17
Lopez Burgos, ibid para 12.3; Celiberti, ibid para 10.3.
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Covenant as to permit a State party to perpetrate violations of the
Covenant on the territory of another State, which violations it could not
perpetrate on its own territory’.18 In the Committee’s General Comment
31 it affirmed this interpretation of Article 2 and that it applied even when
the individuals in question are not nationals of the state party.19 This was
further confirmed by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the
Palestinian Wall case.20 Similar findings have been made by the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights regarding the applicability of
the Organization of American States Charter and the American Declaration
of the Rights and Duties of Man.21
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has wrestled with the
permissibility of extraterritorial application of the European Convention
on Human Rights on a number of occasions since the early 1990s and has
the most well-developed jurisprudence, though one marked by vacillation. Article 1 of the Convention requires Member States to secure the
Convention protections ‘to everyone within their jurisdiction’. In the 2001
Banković case the Court employed the international law principles of jurisdiction as interpretive principles to find that jurisdiction was territoriallybased and could only be extraterritorial in exceptional circumstances.22
However, in the recent cases of Issa23 and Solomou24 the Court took a more
robust approach, finding that states can be held liable for violations by
officials who are operating in a foreign state, where (i) the state agents are
in effective military control of the territory upon which the violation is
committed, or (ii) if the individual is ‘under the authority or control’ of
the state agents.25
The question of whether the Canadian Charter of Rights applies extraterritorially in the execution of Canadian criminal and other public law
powers has been examined a number of times by the Supreme Court of
Canada since the 1990s. All of this jurisprudence, until recently, addressed
the question of whether evidence gathered in a foreign state should be
admitted in criminal prosecutions, or excluded on the basis that it violated certain human rights – either section 8 on privacy (search warrants)
or section 10 (rights upon detention or arrest). In none of the Supreme
ibid.
General Comment No 31, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, para 10 (2004). Put another
way, the UN Committee interpreted ‘and’ in the phrase ‘within its territory and subject to its
jurisdiction’ disjunctively so that a state party is responsible towards persons either in its
territory or subject to its jurisdiction.
20
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territories,
Advisory Opinion, [2004] ICJ 163, paras 107–13.
21
See: Coard v United States, Report No 109/99, Case 10.951 (29 September 1999); Alejandre
v Cuba, Report No 86/99, Case 11.589 (29 September 1999).
22
Banković v Belgium, 2001 – XII ECHR 333, paras 59 and 71.
23
Issa v Turkey (2004) 41 EHRR 567.
24
Solomou and Others v Turkey, App No 36832/97, Decision of 24 June 2008.
25
Issa (n 23) para 71; Solomou (n 24) para 45.
18
19
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Court cases have the developments in the international case law around
Article 2(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
ever been acknowledged, let alone dealt with. Two early decisions refused
to apply the Charter to foreign police and consequently would not give
effect to Charter rights at trial to the extent that the violations directly
implicated foreign police conduct.26 The 1998 case of R v Cook27 addressed
whether the Charter could apply to the actions of Canadian police when
they were in a foreign state – in that case, the interrogation of a suspect in
New Orleans by Canadian officers who had been invited to do so by local
police. The decision of the Supreme Court of Canada was divided, but
most of the judges recognised and engaged with the international law
issues involved. The majority opinion ultimately decided that the Charter
could apply, in part because the nationality principle justified extending
Canada’s jurisdiction over the actions of its police officers, and because
the conduct of the officers created no ‘objectionable extraterritorial effect’,
that is, interference with the foreign state’s sovereignty.
In 2007, however, the Supreme Court reversed the Cook holding
abruptly in the case of R v Hape,28 a money laundering prosecution where
Canadian police (in co-operation with local police) had searched premises
belonging to the Canadian accused that were located in Turks and Caicos.
At his trial in Canada, Hape sought to have the documents seized during
the searches excluded on the basis that they did not comply with section 8
of the Charter, even though the searches complied with local law, citing
Cook in support. However, the Supreme Court held that effect could not
be given – at trial in Canada – to Charter rights vis-a-vis police activities
in the foreign state.
The Court’s starting point was twofold: first, Canada’s laws should be
interpreted in conformity with international law, unless the contrary was
obvious;29 and second, the distinction between prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction should be maintained, in that Canada might be free to
legislate extraterritorially but had to recognise the limits placed by
international law on its ability to enforce its laws extraterritorially. The
goal of this aspect of the Charter was essentially to prescribe rules for
police conduct that would ensure respect for the accused person’s Charter
rights, in this case to be free from unreasonable search and seizure. Making
Canadian police comply with this Canadian law during their investigations would be essentially an act of enforcement jurisdiction. However,
such an act of extraterritorial enforcement jurisdiction would be a violaR v Harrer [1995] 3 SCR 562; R v Terry [1996] 2 SCR 207.
R v Cook [1998] 2 SCR 597.
28
See: n 2. Some of the best recent scholarship on this line of jurisprudence has been done
by Professor John Currie (no relation): see John Currie, ‘International Human Rights Law in
the Supreme Court’s Charter Jurisprudence: Commitment, Retrenchment and Retreat – In No
Particular Order’ (2010) 50:2 Supreme Court Law Review 1.
29
ibid paras 34–39.
26
27
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tion of the locus state’s sovereignty, without consent of that state being
given.30 In this instance, despite the fact that the investigation was a cooperative one, there was no evidence that Turks and Caicos had given
permission for Canadian law to be applied. The local law must govern
any government activities there, including law enforcement. Therefore
any attempt by Canadian officials to act in accordance with the Charter
would be illegal, and ipso facto no Charter remedy could be given at trial.
One must bear in mind that the Charter is the only human rights law of
domestic application that restrains the actions of Canadian state officials.
The effect of the majority’s decision outlined above is that Canadian police
officers and other state officials are essentially immunised from the
Charter’s application when they are acting abroad. But if only the foreign
state’s law applied, the Canadian officials might be subject to more lax
human rights standards or even none at all, depending upon the foreign
state in question. The Court implicitly recognised that this was an unpalatable result, and thus carved out an exception: the Charter could apply
where complying with local law would cause Canadian officials to contravene Canada’s international human rights law obligations.31
Hape has been criticised in the Canadian legal literature and, despite the
Supreme Court’s valiant attempt to wrestle with the international law
issues at play, there are serious methodological problems in the judgment.
At the forefront of these is whether, in applying domestic human rights
laws to domestic police in a domestic trial before a domestic court, extraterritorial enforcement jurisdiction is even engaged. It is surely true that
when they were investigating in Turks and Caicos, the Canadian police
were exercising enforcement jurisdiction in that state. If they had tried to
comply with Canadian laws instead of local laws in the course of the
investigation, that might have constituted an illegal act of enforcement
jurisdiction. However, as Justice Bastarache pointed out in his separate
reasons, the Canadian police had permission to be engaged in enforcement jurisdiction in Turks and Caicos, so no illegality arose from their
activities so long as they complied with the local law, which they did.
Moreover, whether a particular act of extraterritorial enforcement is
illegal is an international law question that engages state responsibility,
and not one that was central to the inquiry before the court. In giving that
question such centrality, the Court appeared to be confusing the question
of jurisdiction with the question of which law applied to the investigation.
Another route was available – apply the Charter to the police actions and
deal with the fact that the Canadian police had to conform with local law
as part of the constitutional analysis. If there was a conflict between the
local law and Canadian law, then this could be factored into a more
30
31

ibid paras 83–92, 96.
ibid paras 96–101.
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nuanced inquiry as to whether a breach actually occurred, or, at least in
criminal cases, as to whether the evidence should be excluded as a result
of the breach.32 This would have allowed the Court to extend extrater
ritorial jurisdiction over potential human rights violations by Canadian
officials outside Canada, as it is arguably bound to do under the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, but would have had,
in the language of Cook, ‘no objectionable extraterritorial effect’.33
The Court’s creation of an exception for when the officials’ activities
would offend Canada’s international human rights obligations is also troubling. This exception draws a false dichotomy between the Charter
(a domestic law implementing international human rights law) and the
international human rights obligations themselves. Once the international
law is implemented in Canadian law then for practical purposes the two
bodies of law are integrated; it makes little sense to say that the Charter
applies only where international human rights law is engaged.34 It also isolates the international law regarding jurisdiction from the human rights
law. As an example of this, it was clear that Canadian officials would be
able to immunise themselves from the Charter when they were acting
abroad, simply by ensuring that they were under the authority of a local
official and that there was no evidence of consent for the application of
Canadian law. Yet, this would not necessarily prevent a finding at a state
responsibility level that Canada was in breach of its international law obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights for failing to ensure its officials complied with them when abroad – a jarring result.
These problems resurfaced soon after Hape in the Afghan Detainees
case,35 where Justice MacTavish of the Federal Court of Canada presided
over a motion by Amnesty International and other interveners to apply
the Charter to the actions of Canadian soldiers in Afghanistan. This proceeding had been preceded by significant controversy generated over
allegations that detainees handed over by Canadian forces were being tortured and otherwise abused by their Afghan captors. The applicants were
32
Under Canadian law, exclusion of evidence is not automatic upon the finding of a
breach of the human rights provision. Rather, the court should determine whether, in all the
circumstances, admission of the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute; see: R v Grant, 2009 SCC 32.
33
R v Cook (n 27).
34
The Court nonetheless applied this exception the next year in Khadr v Canada (Minister
of Justice), 2008 SCC 28, ILDC 1031 (CA 2008), where it held that the Charter applied to
Canadian intelligence agents questioning Omar Khadr at the Guantánamo Bay detention
facility on the basis that the entire regime applied there had been found by the US Supreme
Court to violate international human rights law and international humanitarian law. And
see Canada (Prime Minister) v Khadr, 2010 SCC 3.
35
Amnesty International Canada v Canada (Canadian Forces) 2008 FC 336, affirmed 2008 FCA
401 (Fed Ct of Appeal), leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada denied 21 May 2009.
The Federal Court of Appeal restricted its reasons to a review of whether the motions judge
had made any errors of law, without any substantial discussion of Hape or Khadr. All subsequent references are to the motion decision.
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seeking the possibility of human rights remedies under the Charter for
the detainees. It was clear from the outset that the case would involve an
application of Hape. The applicants argued that the military context was
distinguishable, on both law and facts, from the kind of police cooperation dealt with in Hape and called for a different result – in particular
because it was more in line with the kinds of cases dealt with by the
Human Rights Committee and the ECtHR where extraterritorial jurisdiction was exercised.
Justice Mactavish applied Hape to answer the question in the negative.
She found on the facts that, while the government of Afghanistan had
agreed to allow Canadian forces to engage in certain activities – even
enforcement-type activities – on Afghan soil, it had not consented to the
application of Canadian law, including the Charter, as would be required
to make the Charter applicable.36 Rather, Canada and Afghanistan had
agreed that Afghan law and international law, including international
human rights and international humanitarian law, would govern the
activities of Canadian Forces personnel. Accordingly, the Charter could
not be applicable on this basis, since to apply it would be to violate Afghan
sovereignty.
She further dismissed an argument by the applicants that it was
accepted under international law that states were entitled to apply extraterritorial human rights jurisdiction over the acts of their officials in situations where there was ‘effective military control of the person’. In so doing
she made interesting use of the decision of the United Kingdom (UK)
House of Lords in Al-Skeini,37 on one hand adopting the finding of various
Law Lords that the more conservative position of the ECtHR on juris
diction from Banković was ‘better law’ than the more recent finding in Issa;
and on the other hand rejecting the Lords’ conclusion that extending
extraterritorial jurisdiction to a British prison facility in Iraq was an
acceptably modest move. While acknowledging the trend towards positive findings on extraterritorial jurisdiction in the international human
rights case law,38 she ultimately ruled that this position was too unsettled
to merit a different application than that dictated by Hape.39
In part, the latter finding seems to have resulted from falling into the
trap laid by the Supreme Court’s odd distinction between the Charter and
international human rights law in Hape, as evidenced in the following
passage from Afghan Detainees:
ibid para 170.
Al Skeini et al v Secretary of State for Defence [2007] UKHL 26. The decision of the European
Court of Human Rights in Al-Skeini (App No 55721/07, 7 July 2011) was released in July
2011, too late for consideration here.
38
And considering both General Comment 31 and United Nations Committee Against
Torture (General Commentary No 2: Implementation of Article 2 by States Parties (23/11/2007,
CAT/C/GC/2/CRP.1/Rev.4).
39
Afghan Detainees (n 35) paras 214, 281.
36
37
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It should also be noted that the comments of the United Nations Human Rights
Committee relied upon by the applicants as supporting a more expansive
approach to extraterritorial human rights jurisdiction are made in the context of
an examination of the scope of the legal obligations on States Parties imposed
by Article 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The comments do not address the extraterritorial reach of the domestic laws of States
Parties.40

It is important to remember that central to Hape was the presumption that
domestic legislation is in conformity with international law, unless the
contrary is explicit. It would have been just as easy, and more sound methodologically, to say that since the Charter implements the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights obligations, and the UN Human
Rights Committee’s views as well as the ICJ’s decision in the Palestinian
Wall case shows that extraterritorial jurisdiction is permissible, if not
obligatory, the Charter must be amenable to extraterritorial application –
particularly where the remedy is a domestic one and the sovereignty concerns that so motivated the Supreme Court’s approach in Hape are more
illusory than real. This is an unsatisfying result; the important principle of
state sovereignty has been used to vanquish a threat to it that did not
exist.
As can be seen from the foregoing, the predominantly customary international law of jurisdiction and the treaty-based law of jurisdiction with
respect to international human rights co-exist and interact in a state of, if
not tension, then uneasiness, and certainly not unity. For many years
states have universally accepted that the activities of one state’s national
in a foreign state can give rise to the home state’s right to exercise its public law powers, in the sense of criminal prosecution based on the nationality principle or another acceptable ground of extraterritorial prescriptive
jurisdiction. However, increasingly it is the activities of a state official in
the foreign state that are being dealt with, activities which are overlain
with the prohibition on extraterritorial enforcement jurisdiction. Human
rights treaties oblige states to require that their officials and agents comply with human rights norms, and a number of international courts and
adjudicative bodies have extended that obligation extraterritorially.41
However, as Hape shows, this perspective is at odds with the conservative
approach national courts have traditionally taken to extraterritorial jurisdiction out of reciprocal respect for state sovereignty. What is clear is that
the human rights regimes are having at least a stretching effect upon the
international law of jurisdiction respecting public law process, though
whether it is fragmentation or a nascent sectoral realignment is difficult to
tell.
40
41

ibid para 240.
See: nn 15–24 and accompanying text.
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IV. PRIVATE LAW REMEDIES IN CANADA FOR INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES

Just as perpetrators of international human rights abuses are subject to
condemnation and sanctions, so their victims may expect to receive repar
ation. Local courts in the territory of abuse are frequently unable to render
justice, often because the state, though involved in the violence, is immune
from suit or exerts influence or condones corruption that defeats the independence and impartiality of the judiciary. Victims of violence tend to try
to escape their tormenters by fleeing abroad and then, after recuperation,
they seek redress in their new state of refuge or asylum. Canadian courts
have received a number of these claims, of which the Bouzari case, mentioned in the Introduction, is a classic example.42 Unfortunately, all of
them to date have been dismissed on the basis of a lack of domestic jurisdiction over the foreign events or a claim of sovereign immunity by the
foreign defendant. Arguably, however, the courts have failed to pay
appropriate attention to other international legal obligations regarding
their international responsibility.
Bouzari v Iran43 involved horrible and despicable acts of torture. As the
Ontario Court of Appeal stated: ‘From June 1993 to January 1994 Houshang
Bouzari was abducted, imprisoned and brutally tortured by agents of the
Islamic Republic of Iran. Shortly after his release, he escaped from Iran and
eventually came to Canada as a landed immigrant in 1998. He now seeks to
sue Iran for the damages he suffered.’44 It may be added that Bouzari was
approached more than once by the second son of the President of Iran with
intimations about a large business deal prior to his physical mistreatment. It
should also be noted that, in trying to sue Iran in the Canadian courts,
Bouzari did not name any of his tormenters as co-defendants.45
In this and similar situations,46 the claims of the victim of abuse deserve
greater judicial attention than they often receive in three respects: i) by
42
See also: Arar v Syrian Arab Republic (2005), 127 CRR (2d) 252, 2005 CanLII 4945 (ON
SC), Kazemi (Estate of) v Islamic Republic of Iran, 2011 QCCS 196 (CanLII), and Arone’s case
against Canada, discussed by John Terry, ‘Taking Filártiga on the Road: Why Courts Outside
the United States Should Accept Jurisdiction Over Actions Involving Torture Committed
Abroad’ in Craig Scott (ed), Torture as Tort (Oxford/Portland Oregon, Hart Publishing, 2001)
109, 130.
43
See: n 3.
44
ibid para 1.
45
As occurred in the comparable UK case of Jones v Minister of the Interior of the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia, [2004] EWCA Civ 1394, rev’d [2006] 2 WLR 1424, [2006] UKHL 26.
46
Compare similar claims in various other national courts such as Filartiga v Pen-Irala, 630
F2d 876 (2nd Circ 1980) (US, under unique legislation), Prefecture of Voiotia v Federal republic
of Germany (2001) 95 Am J Int’l L 198 (English report by Maria Gavouneli and Elias Bantekas)
(Greece, Sup Ct); Ferrini v Federal Republic of Germany (2005) 99 AJIL 242 (English report by
Andrea Bianchi), (2004) 87 RDI 539 (Italy, Court of Cassation), Jones ibid, and Al-Adsani v
Kuwait (No 2) (1996) 107 ILR 536 (UKHL).
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analogy to the universal jurisdiction over the perpetrator of the criminal
abuse, ii) on account of the obligations under international human rights
law to provide domestic remedies, and iii) by recalibrating the scope of
the exception for state immunity from jurisdiction.
A. Universality of Jurisdiction over International Human Rights
Abuses
The refusal of Canadian courts to assert civil jurisdiction over defendant
perpetrators within their reach for human rights abuses committed abroad
relies on the forum’s attitude towards foreign torts and delicts. While ready
to exercise remedial jurisdiction over wrongs that are committed within
Canada, they are cautious about asserting jurisdiction over activities
beyond Canada, except in special circumstances. This is a realistic approach
on both practical and legal grounds. Although the international legal principles declared in the Lotus case47 would support an exercise of prescriptive
jurisdiction, they would not permit enforcement if that involved breaching
the fundamental rule against interfering in the affairs and territory of
another sovereign state.48 Thus, while a Canadian court might grant an
order to issue a writ out of its geographic jurisdiction, it could not sub poena
the defendant or witnesses in the foreign state to attend in Canada. As a
result, unless there is a ‘real and substantial connection’49 to Canada,
Canadian courts ordinarily declare themselves fora non conveniens for suits
against foreigners for alleged wrongs committed on foreign soil.
Such an attitude is quite appropriate for ordinary incidents such as accidents and assaults, but violent abuses of international human rights are
not ordinary wrongs. They are exceptional human misconduct and their
perpetrators are hostes humani generis. The most appropriate analogy for
international human rights violations is not to torts or delicts but to international crimes.
Torture, such as Houshang Bouzari suffered, is an outright crime under
international law.50 It is also, along with murder, extermination, enslavement, illicit imprisonment, rape, persecution, disappearance, apartheid,
and other inhumane acts causing great suffering or serious injury, a crime
against humanity when performed as part of a widespread or systematic
attack against a civilian population.51 Canada, as a party to the Convention
See: n 1.
See: n 10 and accompanying text.
49
The phrase is drawn from the leading Canadian case, Morguard Investments Ltd v De
Savoye [1990] 3 SCR 77.
50
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment and
Punishment (1984) 1465 UNTS 85, Can TS 1987 No 36, arts 1–4.
51
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, UN Doc A/CONF 183/9 (17 July
1998) 37 ILM 999, art 7.
47
48

Canada and International Law 231
Against Torture and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court,52 has accepted the obligation to detain and prosecute any accused
found in Canada wherever he or she may have committed these crimes.
The Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act53 explicitly asserts
jurisdiction over offences that take place outside Canada and over the
perpetrators who are subsequently located within Canada.54
Victims of such crimes have a legitimate expectation of a remedy from
their perpetrators since the internationally prohibited acts also constitute
violent abuses of internationally protected human rights. This legitimate
expectation is bolstered in international law by Article 75 of the Rome
Statute in favour of reparation to victims and the establishment of a Trust
Fund for that purpose. It is supported in Canadian law by analogy to
Canada’s own victims of crime legislation.55 Accordingly Canadian courts
ought to consider exerting parallel civil jurisdiction as well. International
law does not forbid such jurisdiction; indeed, international human rights
laws demand that domestic provision be made for effective remedial civil
jurisdiction.
Variants of this argument were presented in the Bouzari case but the
Court dismissed them all. In its view there was no justification for a departure from the ordinary practice of applying the test of real and substantial
connection of the unlawful incidents with Canada. In particular, the Court
did not acknowledge any customary or conventional international legal
obligation that required it to apply a rule of universal jurisdiction in a civil
action for torture committed abroad by a foreign state defendant.56 The fact
that the defendant was a foreign state entitled to sovereign immunity before
the Canadian court was a decisive factor in this decision. The Court did not
make a determination under the real and substantial connection test but it
noted that its application in this case was ‘not easy’57 because the allegations
of torture were violations of international law and no other forum was open
to the plaintiff. The Court’s sensitivity to, and respect for, the international
human rights at stake even as it applied the international right of state
immunity displays the conflicted condition of the international law of jurisdiction. The Canadian Court’s uncertainty raises intriguing speculation
how the decision in the case might have differed had the perpetrators,
rather than the state, been sued. The legal arguments favouring civil court
See: nn 50, 51 respectively.
SC 2000, c 24.
ibid ss 6, 8.
55
The federal government has appointed an Ombudsman for Victims of Crime
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ibid para 38.
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jurisdiction by analogy to criminal court powers is still sustainable. Indeed,
it is supported by an additional obligation of the international human rights
laws, which, it will now be argued, applies to domestic courts directly.
B. International Obligations to Provide Remedies for Human Rights
Abuses
The obligation to protect the human person is set forth in the strongest
terms that international law can muster. Many human rights norms,
including those covering violent and other egregious abuse under discussion here, are fundamental, non-derogable, jus cogens, and erga omnes.
Regrettably the concepts and law underlying this statement have not been
adequately addressed by, or perhaps even to, Canadian courts petitioned
by international human rights victims.
The human rights to life, liberty and security and the corollary freedoms
from torture, slavery, servitude and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment found in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights58
deal with the very existence and integrity of the human person. States are
obliged to prevent and remediate abuse of these rights in the strongest
terms.59 Of these rights, freedom from torture, the specific basis of claim in
Bouzari’s case, is more particularly regulated by the Convention Against
Torture.60 This group of rights at least, if not the whole body of human
legal protections, have a special legal status. They are obligations erga
omnes. As the ICJ in the Barcelona Traction case declared, erga omnes obligations are derived, inter alia, ‘from the principles and rules concerning basic
human rights of the human person’.61 That means these human rights
are treaty obligations owed to the international community as a whole,
specifically amongst all signatory states for the benefit of all individuals.
It is often too quickly assumed that these obligations to protect human
rights and to redress their abuse have territorial limitations.62 But human
beings migrate, especially after persecution and violent abuse, and they
carry their human rights with them. Thus it happens, as Bouzari’s case
illustrates, that a victim of human rights violations in one state flees to
another state in search of refuge and remediation. While the state of the
abuse ought, in the first place, to remedy the situation and to reparate the
victim, the state of refuge arguably also incurs an obligation to ensure
See: n 14 arts 6–8.
ibid art 2.
60
See: n 50 arts 1, 14.
61
Barcelona Traction Light and Power Co Case (Belgium v Spain) [1970] ICJ Rep 3, para 34.
62
Attention is drawn to the words of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, art 2(1) obliging the state to ensure human rights ‘to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction’ as supporting an interpretation that limits responsibility
for remedying human rights abuses to the state in which the violations occurred.
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the means of redress to the victim as soon as he/she is admitted to its territory. This approach to reading the human rights treaties is consistent
with the jurisdictional authority of the state over its territory and the
people within it.63 Moreover, it is also gives sensible expression to the erga
omnes character of these human rights obligations on all states parties.
Such an interpretation of the Convention Against Torture was urged on
the Canadian court in Bouzari’s case, specifically on the basis of Article 14,
which states in part:
Each State Party shall ensure in its legal system that the victim of an act of
torture obtains redress and has an enforceable right to fair and adequate compensation including the means for as full rehabilitation as possible.

The appellant, Bouzari, argued that this Article required a state party such
as Canada to allow a torture victim, like him, to bring a civil suit for
redress in the Canadian courts even though that would involve taking
jurisdiction over acts of torture committed abroad. The Court disagreed,
declaring that Convention Against Torture only requires Canada to provide a remedy for a claimant for torture committed within its territorial
jurisdiction. Three reasons were given. First, the silence of the language
of Article 14 on this point was read as ‘not necessarily mean[ing] the
absence of territorial limitation’.64 It might equally have been interpreted
in the reverse way: the silence of Article 14 implies no jurisdictional
limitations.
Secondly, the Court appropriately investigated the state practice around
Article 14 but found none. It accepted one expert witness’ view of a shared
state understanding that Article 14 only demands the provision of civil
remedies for torture committed within the state’s territory. An interpretive
declaration made by the United States (US) at the time of its ratification of
Convention Against Torture was referred to in support of this opinion.65
Arguably the fact that the US felt it needed to make this declaration in the
absence of state practice could indicate that the provision of civil remedies
for torture committed abroad was at least an open legal issue if not a legal
requirement.66
Thirdly, the Court considered the travaux préparatoires of Convention
Against Torture, noting that an early draft of Article 14 had expressly
referred to torture ‘committed in any territory under its jurisdiction’. It
accepted the expert opinion that this clause was ultimately omitted as
superfluous because Article 14 was implicitly already territorially limited,
63
See the interpretation of International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art 2 by
the UN Human Rights Committee (n 19) and accompanying text.
64
See: n 3 para 76.
65
ibid paras 77–79.
66
Furthermore the US substantially reversed its interpretation of Convention Against
Torture, art 14 when it enacted the Torture Victim Protection Act 1991, 28 USC Part IV, ch 85,
para 1350.
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rather than the opposing expert view that its excision indicated an intention
to exclude jurisdictional constraint on the state’s obligation.67
As just explained, the grounds for finding or refuting a territorial
limitation on the state’s jurisdiction in fulfilling its definite obligation to
provide the means for a civil remedy for torture are decidedly weak.68 The
three interpretive arguments might have been determined either way.
Lack of explicit language in the treaty or state practice on the ground
results in a silence around the issue that may mean acquiescence in either
viewpoint. The fact that each side of the case called upon international
law experts69 to assist the court in its interpretation of Convention Against
Torture emphasises the uncertainty around the jurisdiction under the
international law that national courts have to apply.
The Court in Bouzari also separately considered an argument that jus
cogens required it ‘to permit a civil claim against a foreign state for torture
committed abroad’.70 Undoubtedly some human rights are non-derogable
jus cogens. The rights to life, liberty and security under discussion here are
some of the protections that may not be suspended by the state even in
dire times of public emergency.71 Furthermore, these human rights may be
classified as peremptory norms of international law or jus cogens. This
customary international concept has been broadly defined in the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties72 and has been accepted by the ICJ in
the Nicaragua case.73 Its significance lies in its status as a rule of international public order before which any conflicting customary or conventional international law is rendered void and of no effect. Applied in the
present context of human rights protections, there is dispute as to the
rights that have attained the superior status of jus cogens. Legal opinions
differ over whether all or only some, and if some, which, human rights
norms are jus cogens, but there is little doubt that those that are central to
human life and existence and are non-derogable erga omnes obligations
have the force of jus cogens. Thus international human rights rules of
See: n 3 paras 80–81.
The UN Committee Against Torture, which monitors the implementation of Convention
Against Torture, subsequently expressed concern about Canada’s position and recommended review of its interpretation of art 14 ‘to ensure the provision of compensation
through its civil jurisdiction to all victims of torture’. Conclusions and Recommendations of
the Committee Against Torture: Canada, UN Doc CAT/C/CR/34/CAN, 49 (7 July 2005).
And see: CK Hall, ‘The Duty of States Parties to the Convention against Torture to Provide
Procedures Permitting Victims to Recover Reparations for Torture Committed Abroad’
(2007) 18 Eur J Int’l L 921.
69
Professor Ed Morgan of the University of Toronto and Professor Christopher
Greenwood, then of the London School of Economics.
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See: n 3 para 84.
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See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (n 14), art 4 which excepts the
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jus cogens status are compelling at customary international law everywhere for every state.
The Bouzari case appears to be the first time jus cogens was made the
basis of argument in the Canadian courts.74 Importantly, the proposition
that the prohibition of torture is a peremptory rule of international law
was accepted by the litigants, including the Attorney General of Canada,
and the Court.75 But the Court also adopted the view of the motions judge
below that:
An examination of the decisions of national courts and international tribunals,
as well as state legislation with respect to sovereign immunity, indicates that
there is no principle of customary international law which provides an exception from state immunity where an act of torture has been committed outside
the forum, even for acts contrary to jus cogens.76

This judgment decides that the scope of the jus cogens norm prohibiting
the use of torture by the state does not inhibit the resort to sovereign
immunity by the state when called to account in a domestic court for
using torture. The decision severs the right to protection from torture and
the right to a remedy for torture. The Court sought to justify the wisdom
and policy of its opinion as respect for an equilibrium that has developed
to date within international law:
Both under customary international law and international treaty there is today
a balance struck between the condemnation of torture as an international crime
against humanity and the principle that states must treat each other as equals
not subjected to each other’s jurisdiction. It would be inconsistent with this balance to provide a civil remedy against a foreign state for torture committed
abroad.77

This statement purports to relate three quite different international legal
concepts: i) criminal responsibility of the individual, ii) civil liability of the
state, and iii) sovereign immunity of the state. It is not evident that these
concepts are capable of being balanced since they do not all operate on the
same plane. Individual criminal liability is very different from state civil
liability: the position of individuals and states are not comparable. While
individuals may be held criminally responsible in both national and international courts, states are not. Further, criminal and civil legal processes
have different objectives and outcomes. Finally, whether an individual or
a state bears responsibility goes to the merits of a claim, whereas immun
ity affects legal process, that is, it inhibits court jurisdiction even to hear
74
The concept of jus cogens has since been recognised by the Supreme Court of Canada in
Suresh v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) [2002] 1 SCR 3, although the question
whether torture is included in it was sidestepped as unnecessary to the decision.
75
See: n 3 para 87.
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the claim. In any case, it seems most unlikely that any kind of ‘balance’
was either designed or achieved in the development of the international
law since the contending principles arose independently from different
origins through the operation of different law-creating processes.
Clearly, in its discussion of the scope of the jus cogens norm prohibiting
torture, as in earlier parts of its judgment, the Court was much concerned
about the right to immunity of the foreign state defendant. This is a state
right that can so easily overreach a human right if not applied restrictively
that it deserves separate attention in the next section of this chapter. At
this point, it is appropriate to observe once more how the Court’s decision
might have been different if the action had been against the torturers
rather than their state. Absent sovereign immunity concerns, the Court
might have determined that the scope of jus cogens around torture
included peremptory obligations on the state of prevention, prohibition,
prosecution and provision for redress.
The general significance of this discussion about the treatment in the
Bouzari case of the state’s obligations in respect of redress for human
rights abuses abroad is that the Canadian Court had to operate in a context of uncertainty over the jurisdictional rules of international law. The
Convention Against Torture’s open-ended provision on remedial jurisdiction runs contrary to the traditional limits of state powers to persons and
events within its territorial control. The Court felt unable to interpret the
Convention Against Torture as an exception to its territorial jurisdiction,
at least without greater certainty of expression or state practice. The peremptory force of the law about torture was met by the ancient constraint
against asserting jurisdiction over a foreign state. Although the Court
adopted the concept of jus cogens, it did not believe it thereby acquired the
scope of authority to overreach the restriction of state immunity on its
jurisdiction. It remains to be seen whether the arguments based on the
linked protections and remedies for human rights found in International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights would fare any better in a domestic
court than the similar ones founded on Convention Against Torture in the
Bouzari case. What the case surely discloses is that, while the Canadian
Court was open to the arguments of the torture victim to entertain his
civil claim for redress, it found the international law of state jurisdiction
under which it had to operate in considerable uncertainty and disarray.
C. State Immunity from Jurisdiction in Civil Suits for International
Human Rights Abuses
The immunity of the state from the jurisdiction of another state’s courts is
a longstanding principle of customary international law that is central to
every state’s sovereignty and equality. Immunity from jurisdiction extends
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to all domestic court processes whether their nature is civil or criminal,
public or private. On this general principle Bouzari’s claim against Iran
was judged to be beyond the jurisdiction of the Canadian Court.
Though traditionally unlimited or absolute, the practice of state immun
ity is now restrictive. But the scope of the restrictions under customary
international law is neither fixed nor certain.78 A process of development
has been taking place over several decades, promoted by national,
regional and multilateral law making. Some states, like Australia,79
Canada,80 South Africa,81 and the US,82 have enacted foreign state immun
ity statutes while others, such as the members of the European Union,
have concluded an inter-state immunity convention.83 At the United
Nations, a Convention on the Jurisdictional Immunities of States and
Their Property84 has subsequently been concluded. These laws exhibit different definitions of significant concepts, such as the scope of a state’s
identity and its immune constituent entities, the character of non-immune
commercial acts, and the extent of territorial connection with the forum
state necessary to exclude immunity for torts.85 The particular issue of
state immunity from civil actions in domestic courts is now before the ICJ.
Germany instituted proceedings against Italy in December 2008 as a result
of the decision of Italy’s highest court, the Corte de Cassazione, in the
Ferrini case86 that affirmed jurisdiction over a claim ‘brought by a person
who during World War II had been deported to Germany to perform
forced labour in the armaments industry’.87
In Canada, the enactment of the State Immunity Act88 crystallised the
customary international rules within Canadian law. Although customary
international law is automatically adopted within Canadian law, except in
the face of clearly contradictory legislation,89 and statutes are supposed to
be interpreted so far as possible consistently with Canada’s international

78
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obligations,90 this has not happened with the State Immunity Act, at least
not in Bouzari’s case. The approach of the court was to grant Iran such
immunity as is stated in the State Immunity Act and thus to set aside all
arguments based on Canada’s international obligations that supported a
more restrictive interpretation, which might have denied Iran immunity.
The differences between the plaintiff’s arguments and the court’s opinions reveal much about the contending principles of state responsibility
and of state immunity within the jurisdiction of the forum state’s courts.
The Bouzari court’s approach to state immunity may be reviewed from
two different critical viewpoints: i) in a technical manner, like the court,
by exploring the scope of the exceptions to immunity explicitly stated in
the statute, and ii) more broadly, by interpreting the statute in light of
developments in international law regarding state sovereignty and state
responsibility for human rights.
The technical arguments surround the statutory exceptions to the
immunity of the foreign state on account of its involvement in tortious
‘personal or bodily injury . . . that occurs in Canada’91 and contractual
‘commercial activity’.92 The court declared both exceptions inapplicable.
On the tort claim, it might have denied Iran immunity on the evidence
that Bouzari continued to suffer physical and psychological injuries from
his torture after coming to Canada. As to the commercial activity claim,
the court might have held that Iran had no immunity for its grossly coercive and intimidating tactics to secure a business deal with Bouzari. These
interpretations of the State Immunity Act were reasonable alternatives
which this court chose not to adopt. Instead, in confirming Iran’s immun
ity from suit, the court reduced the jurisdiction arguably available to it to
redress human rights abuses.
It probably would not have been necessary to reach for these exceptions
at all if the action had been brought against Bouzari’s abusers. Immunity
is intended to protect the sovereignty of the state so its scope of application to individuals and institutions is limited. State immunity extends to
the ‘head of the foreign state or of any political subdivision . . . while acting as such in a public capacity’.93 The son of the president of Iran and
Bouzari’s other tormentors would not qualify under this element of the
definition. Immunity also protects ‘any government of the foreign state or
of any political subdivision . . . including any of its departments, and any
agency of the foreign state’.94 Obviously governments operate through
officials who are consequently immune when acting on behalf of the state
90
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in a public capacity. The goons who inflicted abuse on Bouzari can hardly
be included in this class of immune persons.95
A broader approach to application of the State Immunity Act was also
open to the court. The contextual method of statutory interpretation that
is applied in Canada,96 together with an interpretive presumption that the
legislature, in enacting statutes, does not intend to violate international
law,97 requires Canadian courts to take into account such international law
as exists on the matter before them and to strive to interpret the governing
legislation consistently with that law.98 Thus, the responsibility on the
courts to provide access to remedies to victims of international human
rights abuses, as discussed previously, should have been brought to bear
on this court’s interpretation of the State Immunity Act. It was not. The
court observed: ‘Even if Canada’s international law obligations required
that Canada permit a civil remedy for torture abroad by a foreign state,
Canada has legislated in a way that does not do so’.99 Perhaps Canada has,
but equally perhaps those non-derogable erga omnes human rights obligations of jus cogens status could have informed the court’s interpretation of
the statutory exceptions to state immunity and thus led to a legitimate
application of the State Immunity Act that would also have fulfilled these
international responsibilities.100
In not pursuing this path, the Canadian court displayed a greater concern for the traditional concept of state sovereignty over the more recent
norm of state responsibility to provide judicial remedies for international
human rights violations. That said, the court faced a difficult decision
constrained as it was, on the one hand, by a longstanding principle of
95
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state immunity from jurisdiction, which was confirmed by an explicit
restatement in the governing legislation, and urged, on the other, by a
newer obligation of affirmative action on human rights. The court’s predicament exposes the conflicted character of the jurisdictional principles
at stake. The development and imposition of international human rights
obligations within the national arena has not been accompanied by the
necessary accommodation and reform of the restraining principle of sovereign immunity from national jurisdiction. Domestic courts have been
left to find a way through this confusion. It is not surprising if courts in
different countries reach different, even opposing, solutions. The allowance of state immunity in the Bouzari case in Canada may be contrasted
with its disallowance in the Ferrini case in Italy. The disparity of inter
pretive views in Bouzari, which received weight and veracity from the
contemporary yet contrary decision in Ferrini, points up the disarray and
disunity in the practice of state immunity. The rules of foreign state
immunity from jurisdiction are no more certain and unified than the rest
of the international law regarding the assertion of state jurisdiction.101
V. REFLECTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

Speaking generally, the principles of state jurisdiction and state immunity
have been adopted as customary international law for a very long time.
As concepts, they have been broadly accepted and understood. But more
particular rules introduced in more recent times – such as the provisions
of international human rights treaties – have cut deeply into the domestic
jurisdiction of states. As a result, their judicial systems, for example the
Canadian courts, have become unsure about the scope of their jurisdiction. In Canada the courts are particularly puzzled about the degree of
jurisdictional deference they should accord to foreign sovereigns in the
face of obligations to assert jurisdiction to protect international human
rights and to remediate their violations.
As the previous discussion has shown, there is jurisdictional uncertainty in both public/criminal and private/civil cases. In the public law
area tensions exist between the sovereignty of the foreign state in its own
territory and the international human rights obligations carried along by
Canadian officials who go to work there. In the private law field the pressures are between the immunity of the foreign state in Canadian territory,
especially from Canadian court jurisdiction, and the international human
rights requirements on Canada to assert remedial jurisdiction.
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The fact that Germany and Italy have engaged in litigation before the ICJ over the
customary law rules of immunity from foreign state jurisdiction (n 87) corroborates this
observation.
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So when does foreign state sovereignty trump the permissive powers,
or even the mandatory responsibilities, of domestic jurisdiction? These
are big issues which national court systems cannot resolve individually.
Their decisions do add to the corpus of state practice from which customary international law may, perhaps, grow. But such cumulative state practice as exists at present around these jurisdictional issues is too indefinite
within particular domestic court systems and too various between different national legal systems to found customary international law norms.
In a sense, domestic courts should not be blamed for this disunity since
they do not directly create international law by their individual decisions
but only seek what it is in order to apply it. Most of international law is
made as well as administered by the executive, that is, the government, of
the state. However, the rules of jurisdiction and immunity are pre-
eminently examples of international law that fall to the judicial organ of
the state, that is, the domestic courts, to apply in the course of their work.
Consequently, their performance bears witness to the condition of this
law. Moreover, in an era of increasing inter-judicial dialogue between the
courts of different states, how one court makes its finding on the current
state of international law can affect others. In the Canadian context, this
was illustrated in Afghan Detainees by the Federal Court of Canada’s use
of the Law Lords’ decision in Al-Skeini, discussed above. In this sense,
then, national courts can be prime movers towards either unity or fragmentation of this body of international law, since the views expressed by
national courts can affect the findings of other courts, and all of them contribute to a matrix of state practice that, as a result, may trend towards
consistency or confusion.
The state of the rules on jurisdiction is, in part, the consequence of the
piecemeal process of creation of international law in this area. The concepts of state jurisdiction and foreign state immunity from jurisdiction
developed slowly by inter-state actions and reactions into customary
international law. They have produced legal conflicts at times over particular actions in specific sectors of state interests where one state con
sidered another had overstepped the legitimate limits of these general
principles. For instance, when the US courts developed the ‘effects’ doctrine to claim jurisdiction in anti-trust (competition) cases over foreign
corporations on account of very indirect and far from proximate effects of
their foreign commercial activities on US trade, Europe and Canada,
amongst others, responded politically with strong representations about
interference with their sovereign jurisdiction, and legally with nullification and ‘claw back’ legislation to prohibit compliance and enforcement
of US court judgments.102
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In general, however, states have in the past managed to operate the traditional principles of state jurisdiction and foreign state immunity from
jurisdiction in a co-operative manner. They have largely stayed within
their territorial limits and deferred, out of comity, to the foreign state’s
authority in those infrequent instances when a potential clash of national
powers arose. Thus, notwithstanding the permissiveness of the jurisdictional principles declared in the Steamship Lotus case, territorial jurisdiction has been the primary practice of states, as to both prescription and
execution of law, except in respect of visiting foreign sovereigns and their
property and representatives, when so-called ‘absolute’ immunity from
the local jurisdiction was granted. But the introduction of restrictions on
immunity and of obligations to protect international human rights in the
second half of the twentieth century has inevitably altered state practice
and raised the problems discussed in this chapter.
Although some restrictions on state immunity are now nearly universally accepted as a proposition, the actual limits are uncertain. The variety
in national state immunity statutes attests to the lack of consensus amongst
states on the degree of jurisdictional deference they should accord each
other domestically. Added to this disorder are the impacts of the relatively
new conventional and customary laws in respect of international human
rights. Their provisions reach far into the state’s domestic jurisdiction with
stringent and specific obligations. As domestic courts wrestle with the
resulting problems over when to assert and when to defer their authority, it
is noticeable that all these new international rules have been made without
adequate, if any, reference to the traditional customary international law of
state jurisdiction. No wonder there is confusion that is mirrored in national
court practice.
Is the Canadian courts’ experience synechdochal? Are the Hape, Bouzari
and Afghan Detainees cases a micro-level illustration of the overall state of
the international law of jurisdiction? They certainly indicate that Canadian
courts are resisting treaty-based developments because they feel constrained by more traditional international jurisdictional principles. While
Afghan Detainees and Bouzari contained laudatory first efforts at dealing
with the international developments regarding extraterritorial jurisdiction in the public and private law spheres respectively under the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights regime, Canada’s
highest court has yet to engage this jurisprudence on interpretation of the
human rights treaties. On the surface it appears that while some of the
world is attempting to explore the parameters of how and when human
rights obligations may apply extraterritorially, Canada has fallen back on
the restraining principles of sovereignty as the dominant rule, without
adequately factoring in the new and dynamic international human rights
jurisdictional norms. The Supreme Court continues to use the broader
contours of the international law of jurisdiction without inquiry into how
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these apply in the context of human rights. Put this way, it might be said
simply that the Supreme Court is swimming against the tide. More significantly, recent Canadian case law as a whole is an example of state
practice that reflects, even contributes, to fragmentation in the international law of jurisdiction – ironically, this is because Canadian courts, as in
the Afghan Detainees case, view that law as being fragmented.

